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CAPACITY AND FORM OF MARRIAGE IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
I
BARS IMPOSED BY.PERSONAL LAW
The development of private international law seems to have
this in common with the evolution of public international law,
that it proceeds in a bewildering sort of zig-zag fashion: a
settled proposition appears to be laid down and to obtain uni-
versal acceptance, upon which the world has no occasion for it
for a decade or two, completely forgets it, and after a spell of
other activities treats the settled rule as though it had never been,
and ultimately works round to it again de novo. Long spells
of maritime peace, such as that between 1865 and 19o4, made
the world forget the laws of war at sea. In 1861 Brook v.
Brook' emphatically enunciates the paramountcy of the personal
law in respect of capacity2 for marriage, and in 19o7 the personal
law is set on one side in Ogden v. Ogden.3
The infrequency of these cases involving persons and places of
different national complexion has hitherto made it inevitable that
there should be no strong catena of decisions-no abiding judicial
consciousness of the proper rule. All the more important is it
that the true principle should be made so clear by science that
courts cannot e misled.
But it is not so easy to say what the principle is.
It-is probable that this is just one of those cases in which any
principle is better than uncertainty. Brook v. Brook, decided
long ago by the very highest English tribunal (the House of
Lords), and by four of the greatest names in British juris-
prudence, seemed to have given a clear and certain rule. Of
1 (1861) 9 H. L. Cas. 193.
"Capacity" in these discussions means simply "legal ability." Mr.
Foote's attempt to distinguish incapacity from the results of an isolated
prohibition (such as prevents marriage within the degrees of affinity, or,
we suppose, of impotent persons) only introduces an unnecessary diffi-
culty, though supported by dicta in Ogden v. Ogden [19o8] I P. 46. If it
is not legal for A to enter into a particular union, A has not "capacity"
to make it. Wilson V. Cook (913) 40 Clunet, 986.
" [x9o8] 1 P. 46.
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the peers who took part in the decision, Campbell, Cranworth,
St. Leonards, were or had been Lord High Chancellor. Wensley-
dale (Baron Parke) was the most consummate common lawyer
of his day. Not the decision alone but the language of the
parties to that opinion indicated clearly that capacity to contract
marriage is governed by the personal law of each party.
Marriage is a sort of co-emptio; and caveat emptor. Each
party must beware lest the other may chance to be incapable.
The fact of foreign connections will generally be patent. In
any case, a deceived party is in no worse case than a party to
a bigamous marriage. Some risks must be taken by anyone
who embarks on matrimony. And one who marries a foreigner
is put upon inquiry.
But "hard cases make bad law": and hard cases began to arise.
Persons of foreign domicile came to England and induced Eng-
lish persons to go through the form of marriage with them in
England. The anxiety of the judges ut res magis valeret led them
to break holes in the clear doctrine of Brook v. Brook.
Let it be observed that the principle that capacity to marry is
measured by the personal law, and not by the law of the place of
celebration, is quite independent of any general theory of capacity
to enter into contracts. Marriage is an affair, not of contract,
but of status. It is not the promise to marry, but the ceremony
of marriage, of which we are treating. Capacity to make
ordinary business contracts and the casual agreements of every-
day life may well be regulated by the law of the place of contract,
or the place of its contemplated performance. The acceptance
of a totally new status, affecting the entire future of the party,
is quite a different matter. Let it be noted, too, that for Ameri-
can and English lawyers, the "personal" law is the law with
which an individual is presumed to have most to do, and to be
most in touch with-the law of his or her domicile, i. e., the last
place where he or she was settled with no intention of ever
permanently removing therefrom. On the continent of Europe
(though not generally in South America), the criterion of the
political nationality has, through political causes, for some half-
century supplanted it, except in Denmark and Switzerland. And
it will further be borne in mind that domicile in England means
something very much more permanent than the continental
domicile. It is almost impossible to acquire a new domicile in
the English sense, except by very long residence or the closest
connection. On the other hand, a Danish domicile determining
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his age of majority was held, in Copenhagen, to have been
acquired by a Swede who had been three years a steward on
Danish steamers. No intention to reside permanently in Den-
mark was shown, and this would have been imperative by
English practice.
Now, it was admitted in Brook v. Brook that the ceremonial
and forms of the marriage must be those of the country where
it is celebrated. Lex loci regit actus.' And therefore one means
of evading Brook v. Brook was ready to hand. One could call
an apparent incapacity a mere matter of form. In fact, Lord
Campbell had suggested this, in Brook v. Brook itself. He
explained an earlier case, Steele v. Bradwell,5 which he might
have overruled or (as being an Irish case) disregarded, as one
in which there was no real question of incapacity, but one of
form merely. Certain consents, required by the law of the
domicile, but not by the law of the place of celebration, were
held to be no essential conditions of capacity; and a person
who could not marry without them in his own domicile, Ireland,
was held to be bound if he purported to marry without them in
Scotland."' But on such reasoning one could explain away almost
any incapacity as a matter of form, as Westlake observes. They
were imperative restrictions, just as much as the attainment of a
particular age. Another case, decided rather later than this, was
perfectly in consonance with the doctrine of Brook v. Brook,
but was difficult to reconcile with Campbell's explanation of
Steele v. Bradwell. This was the Sussex Peerage Case.7 The
Duke of Sussex had married Lady Augusta Murray at Rome
without the consent of King George III. If consents were mat-
ters of form, the law of Rome knew nothing of the British
Royal Marriage Act, and the marriage was perfectly good.
The Lords decided otherwise, advised by the judges. It is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two cases; and it
"This maxim is not accepted by all countries as excluding the validity
of the forms prescribed by the personal law.
(x838) z Milw. Eccl. i. This case was decided by Dr. Radcliffe, the
Episcopal Chancellor of Dublin-if the writer's recollection is correct-
and would not of itself be of very great authority.
"Martin v. Foberg (i889) i6 Clunet, 138. Cf. Winans v. Attorney-
General ['9o4] A. C. 287, where twenty years' residence was held
insufficient.
(z844) ixi CL & F. 85. Distinguish Prince de Sayh's Case (1883) 1o
Clunet, 312.
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seems best, with Westlake, to treat the Irish one as overruled,
and to dissent from Lord Campbell's view of it. Consents, if
imperatively required, are matters of capacity and not merely
of form. Still, when they are not imperatively required, but can
be evaded by the observance of further formalities-as by the
acte respectueux in France-they can be plausibly, and perhaps
rightly, represented as mere forms. And so, in Simonsn v.
Mallac,8 the divorce judge, Cresswell, succeeded in upholding the
English marriage of a domiciled French subject who had not
obtained the necessary parental consents-on the ground that by
observing certain forms he might, even in France, have done
without them.9
But the more insidious ground of attack on the broad prin-
ciple of Brook v. Brook was the fact that both parties had there
gone abroad to evade their common (English) personal law. That
was not the ground of the decision, which was squarely placed on
the propriety of recognizing the limitations imposed on each
party by his or her personal law, irrespective of their desire to
evade it. The Lords do not stress the special impropriety of two
persons conspiring to avoid the operation of their joint personal
law. And in a very remarkable case of Mette v. Mette,
10 Cress-
well laid down the same rule of the paramountcy of the personal
law, where only one party was subject to the incapacity. A
domiciled Englishman purported to marry his deceased wife's
sister in Frankfort. Her law (German) did not prohibit the
marriage: his did," and Cresswell held it invalid.
' (i86o) 2 Sw. & Tr. 67.
' Olivecrona, Validit6 du mariage des itrangers devant la loi su~doise,
(1883) io Clunet, 351, 352, thinks that in Sweden consents would always
be treated as matters of form.
" (1859) r Sw. & Tr. 416; see also De Wilton v. Montefiore [igoo] 2
Ch. 481.
'Foote, Priv. Int. Jurispr. (4th ed.) p. ioo, suggests that the personal
law of the intended husband, being that of the "intended matrimonial
domicile," may be decisive. But this is surely preposterous. Until the
marriage is celebrated the lady is properly still under the protection and
scope of her own personal law. It lies with it to say whether her inten-
tion can be lawfully carried out; that is, if we adopt the doctrine of the
personal law being at all decisive. In Mette v. Mette, supra, Cresswell
says that there can be no contract unless each is severally competent
to contract. And in fact, Foote himself, p. 97, recognizes that to apply
to the lady the law of the other party's domicile is "to beg the question
of their marriage."
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In this state of the decisions, it seems impossible to say that
common elopement to evade a common incapacity was the true
ground of Brook v. Brook. It was the intention of the House of
Lords to lay down a general principle of the paramountcy of
a personal law. The question arose, but unfortunately not for
ten years, in Sottomayor v. De Barros.12 This case had a com-
plicated history. It was first tried on the footing that both
parties were domiciled Portuguese; and subsequently, in some
manner not easy to understand or to explain, on the footing that
one was, by domicile, Portuguese and the other English. The
most authoritative judgment (that which was delivered by three
Lord Justices on the appeal in the first case) completely con-
firmed Brook v. Brook in the fullest sense: indeed Lord Justice
Cotton enunciated the authority of the personal law as applying
to all contracts, and his opinion remains the principal authority
for that proposition. Sir R. Phillimore, in the court below, had
not applied the Portuguese personal law, distinguishing Brook v.
Brook partly on the ground that the latter was a case of English
people evading English law abroad, whereas this was only a
case of foreigners evading foreign law in England; and partly
on the authority of Simonin v. Mallac. The Court of Appeal
reversed this, and expressly put the case on the broadest prin-
ciple, apart from national considerations, and as expressly,
adopted the view that Simonin v. Mallac turned on the purely
formal character of the consents there required. But the Queen's
Proctor intervened: the case was retried before the divorce
judge Hannen on the footing that the asserted husband had been
domiciled in England. Hannen seized at that circumstance to
explain away Brook v. Brook on a ground which had not been
argued before the Court of Appeal (and could not well have
been), viz., that it applied only to cases of an elopement to evade
the stringency of a common personal law.n Such were certainly
the facts in Brook v. Brook; but as we have seen, the case did
not turn on this peculiarity. And Hannen's view was dia-
metrically opposed to (i) the dicta of the Court of Appeal in
the earlier case of Sottomayor v. De Barros; (2) the speeches
of the Lords in Brook v. Brook; (3) Mette v. Mette. That is,
it conflicts with Mette v. Mette, if mutatis mutandis, a foreign
(1877) 2 P. D. 81 ; (1878) $3 P. D. 1 ; (1879) 5 P. D. 94.
Cf. Roth v. Roth (1882) 104 Ill. 35; Wilson v. Cook (913) 40
Clunet, 986.
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prohibition is as much entitled to be recognized as an English
one, which one is tempted sometimes to believe the courts are
slow to realize.
Nevertheless, when the question, having enjoyed a refreshing
sleep of thirty years, came up again in Ogden v. Ogden, it was
Hannen's views, and not St. Leonard's, Wensleydale's, Cotton's,
Cresswell's or Campbell's, that had the most influence with the
court. Here was a French boy, Ldon Philip, incapable of
marriage by the observance of any formality, without a certain
consent. He came temporarily to England and married without
it.14 The Court of Appeal, affirming Justice Deane, held him
validly married. Apparently they regarded this indispensable
consent as a "formality," and intended to leave the question
open of the effect of an "absolute prohibition" imposed by the
personal law. Confusion is thus worse confounded. The con-
jecture may be hazarded that in the future the doctrine of Brook
"'This, it will be seen, was precisely parallel to the case of Prince
Jerome Bonaparte, who married Miss Patterson in Maryland at the
age of nineteen, without the consents required by Napoleon Is then
recent code. The validity of this marriage, Wharton says, has never been
contested in the Tnited States. Cf. his article, Du mariage aux E tats-
Unis (i87g) 6 jouR. DE DRorr iNT. riRivf, 228, 235. It will be remembered
that Napoleon I's own marriage to Josephine was annulled for reasons of
form. Wharton's opinion that the Pope, in refusing-to annul Jerome's
marriage, adhered to the view that the personal law does not extend
beyond the limits of the lawgiver's territory, appears to rest on a con-
fusion. In the eyes of the Vatican, the edicts of the French lawgiver
were not in issue. The only question for His Holiness was, had the
decrees of the Council of Trent been promulgated at Baltimore? and it
was found that they had not.
Military consents are needed in various cases. I doubt much whether
they would be treated as imperative in England; not because they are
mere formalities, but because they are on a par with monastic disabilities.
But German disabilities of this kind have been enforced in Belgium.
Bausch v. State (1914) 41 Clunet, 99W.
Governmental consents are (or were) required in Bavaria (except the
Palatinate) and the Tyrol, and in the former country entailed, until 1892,
nullity if pretermitted. In 1872, this was relaxed in the case of Bavarians
settled out of Europe; and in 1892, the penalty of nullity was retroac-
tively relaxed, which produced some very pretty metaphysical problems
as to bigamy. These were rendered the more easy of solution in that
the invalid marriage could always be validated by an ex post facto
certificate of consent Keidel, Le mariage des Bavarois i l'6tranger
(1897) 24 Clunet, 986. In Greece the consent of the bishop of the diocese
is requisite. (903) 30 Clunet, 91o.
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v. Brook will be reverted to, whether the parties have the same
or different domiciles; and that possibly the anomalous excep-
tion of disregarding foreign incapacities to marry without cer-
tain consents will be maintained, and represented as justified by
the formal character of such legislative provisions when enacted
by another than an English legislature.
The personal law, even if admitted to be decisive, may be self-
limiting. It has been held in Austria, that the prohibition of
marriage between a Catholic and a Jew is directed merely against
the scandal of celebration within the realm. Such a marriage
elsewhere contracted by parties whose personal law is Austrian
will, it was said, be regarded as valid, if valid where celebrated., 5
But the same court, a year previously, had held invalid the mar-
riage in Saxony of a Catholic Austrian with a divorced person (a
Saxon)"8 ; and in i9o4 had done the same in regard to this very
case of Austrian Catholic and Jew marrying abroadY.1  More
than that, the same court had in i9o4 also laid down that such
a mixed marriage was intolerable to Austrian law, wherever or
by whatsoever country folk contracted !1 The Irish case of
Swzift v. Attorney-General must, of course, be clearly distin-
guished from the first-mentioned of these Austrian cases: in
Swift's case, the party could have married in Ireland itself, by
the use of a proper form-the employment of a Protestant
minister. The statute, i9 Geo. II, which prohibits Protestants
from being married by a Catholic priest, does not impose on them
any incapacity to marry Catholics. It merely regulates forms, and
a domiciled Irish Catholic did not need to observe them abroad.
It is not, therefore, the case of a self-limiting personal statute,
as the Austrian law (as interpreted in the case referred to)
might be. It may be noted that the present tendency in Austria
appears to be to apply all these personal incapacities to Austrians
who marry abroad, if (and only if) the marriage is intended
(i9o8) 35 Clunet, 554, citing (I9O8) Zeitschr. ffr int. Privatrecht, 571,
and (I9O) Juristische BLitter, 82; (io9) 36 Clunet, 88, citing (igo5)
Zentralblatt, 717; (i9) 38 Clunet, 296, citing (19o7) Zentralblatt, 142.
"6 (igo8) 35 Clunet, 1217, citing (igo6) Juristische Blftter, 5oi; see also,
(I909) 36 Clunet, 536, ii6o, 1164, 1167, citing (9o6) Zentralblatt fur
juristische Praxis, io2o, 654, 13r, 128, (i9o5) 726.
' (09o6) 33 Clunet, ii9O.
'On the other hand it was held in Germany that it was equally intol-
erable to German law to recognize such a religious incapacity. (i9o6)
33 Chmet, 119 (Austrian married in Germany). (IO9) 36 Clunet, 785.
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(or perhaps calculated) at the time of its celebration to have
legal results in Austrial--a somewhat forced interpretation of
section four of the Civil Code which seems to have been enacted
aio intuitu, and not to deal with these questions of public policy.
20
And the extreme doctrine, that a Catholic-Jew marriage is
abhorrent, appears to have been abandoned in 19o4, when an
American non-Christian and an American Catholic, resident in
Austria, were held to have been validly married in the United
Kingdom, although they visited it for that express purpose.
II
FORM AND ESSENCE
Great difficulty has arisen from the fact that the notions of
all countries are not all alike as to what is matter of capacity; of
the essential nature of the contract of marriage; and what is
matter of form.
In France, the Tridentine idea has long been current that
"clandestinity" is something more than matter of form, and
"(914) 41 Clunet, 244, r325; (19I1) 37 Clunet, 637; (I91) 38 Clunet,
296. This doctrine seems to date from a decision of I9o5. (igog) 36
Clunet, 8M8. It evidently gives rise to great difficulties of application.
It approximates in practice to applying the law of the domicile (in the
Anglo-American sense). In fact, the decision of the Vienna court in
i9o7, (I911) 38 Clunet, 296, declared such mixed marriages between
Austrians abroad to be valid "if at the time of the celebration, they
entertained no intention of returning" to Austria: precisely the definition
of domicile. Nevertheless, in Igog, a tolerably recent decision (1911) 38
Clunet, 29, citing (igiO) Pravnik, No. xix, adheres to the doctrine that
the prohibition is not local, and that the provisiong of sec. 4 of the code
cannot be relied upon to confer capacity abroad, since marriage is a
life-long and world-wide institution "calculated" and "intended" to con-
fer rights in all countries. To the writer this appears a much more
juridical view. Other decisions upholding the doctrine of specific "inten-
tion" are in (19I1) 38 Clunet, 967, 1297. It is essentially the same
judicial looseness as makes the British courts adopt, as the proper law
of a contract, the law which the parties "intended" to choose, in spite
of the fact that, as Westlake says, it is-the very lawfulness of that inten-
tion which may be in dispute. The uncertainties and difficulties of such
a criterion are manifest. As to the doctrine of "intention" in prize law,
the reader may consult the writer's Britain and Sea Law, passim.
'That sec. 4 is really not in point, is proved by the fact that, in applying
it, the usual temperamenta are not applied, i. e., a minor's "intention" is
given full effect to, although it certainly would not be regarded in a case
of ordinary contract. (i911) 38 Clunet, 969; (1914) 41 Cluet, 1325.
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that its absence, judged by French standards, constitutes, so to
speak, part of the essence of marriage. But unless we regard
the word "forms" as equivalent to "otiose forms," such an
attitude is really one of revolt against the maxim locus regit
actus. Forms are directed to securing some maatter of substance:
to say that the forms which one nation uses are not sufficient to
guard against clandestinity, is to elevate one's own forms to the
plane of essentials. The same may be said of the Servian view,
according to which, as ably expounded by Prof. P6ritch, mar-
riage is a sacrament, and the ecclesiastical form of the Orthodox
Church is an essential. That is, in effect, to relegate non-
Orthodox marriages to a category having nothing in common
with marriage, and to regard them precisely in the way in which
English law regards Oriental marriage, namely, as a different
juridical institution. These questions are not so much questions
of capacity, as questions of the essentials of marriage. But they
are so closely allied to matters of capacity that it is worth saying
a Word about them. The objection to "clandestinity" does not,
in France, annul every marriage entered into by French people
abroad without the necessary ratification in France and consents
by French parents. But it is left to the judge to say whether
they were dispensed with for the sake of clandestinity-an unsat-
isfactory position.21 The marriage of one Sarah Bernhardt with
a Mr. Damele, a Greek, in England, without French forms of
ratification, was upheld in i888;22 but very many marriages of
minors have been annulled in France and in Belgium, and some
in Italy, for want of them. It seems to be otherwise in Holland.
New York, in 1912, annulled a marriage of domiciled New
Yorkers in New Jersey, for want of parental consent, one party
being eighteen 4 ; but it is probable that in this case the marriage
would equally have been invalid in New Jersey itself.
Still more difficulty attends the case, arising in Servia, Bul-
garia, Greece, and Russia, where only religious marriages are
' In a recent Belgian case, Du Bois de Bianco v. Veuve du Val de
Beaulieu (913) 40 Clunet, i322, a marriage was held not clandestine
although one of the motives Was to give it less clat in the eyes of a
relation.
'Ballande v. Bernhardt (i889) 16 Clunet, 641. A contract was repudi-
ated, as made without marital concurrence.
'Reitz v. Dieten (i9o8) 35 Chmet, 1273.
'Cunningham v. Cunningham (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 341; Wilson v. Cook
(1913) 40 Clunet, 986.
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recognized. 25  Is the religious ceremony a mere form? or is
it part of the essence of the institution? According to the law
of the countries in question, it is part of the essence, but that is
not the point. What is it, from the standpoint of other nations?
It is almost certain that the religious ceremony would be
regarded as pure form in England or Scotland, whatever might
be the case in Ireland and Quebec. Yet, in France,26 it was
long regarded as a matter of capacity, to be regulated by the
personal law. A Russian was held unable to marry in France,
therefore, without a religious ceremony, according to decisions
which have been severely criticised by M. Perroud and are
contrary to a Belgian case of 1905. In 1913, the French court
definitely discarded them .
2
Conversely, a purely religious marriage will be recognized in
France, if it has taken place in accordance with the laws of the
place of celebration, even though a religious marriage produces
no legal consequences in France; at any rate, if subjects of that
place are alone concerned.
29
At first sight, the problem which we saw arose in Swift v.
Attorney-General seems to be the same problem as this. But it
is not really so; because in Swift v. Attorney-General nothing
turned on the asserted sacramental character of the marriage.
It was as pure a question of form as could well be imagined.
These Servian and Russian cases, in which a non-sacramental
marriage is not the same kind of marriage at all, involve totally
different principles. Take a case like Stathatos v. Stathatos,0
'On the whole subject of sacramental marriages, see Piritch, De la
comp~tente en Serbie (igoo) 27 Clunet, sec. i, p. 742.
'Edinson v. Edinson (i9o8) 35 Clunet, 1148.
(1905) 32 Clunet, io85, affirming Perlmann v. Bechhafer.
S(194) 41 Clunet, 2o2, affirming Roitstein v. Roitstein. This case,
however, proceeded less on the footing that religious ceremonies were
matters of form than on the sweeping assumption that it was repugnant
to French law to notice religious institutions. The logical consequence
of this position would be to refuse recognition to all religious marriages
wherever celebrated. See Durrighello; see also Mosliczker v. Mosliczker
(i9o6) 33 Clunet, 1146. Austrian Jew married in France without religious
ceremony. Marriage was held void.
* (i916) 43 Clunet, i6o6, affirming Durrghello.
o [Ig13] P. 46; cf. Gachon v. Gachon (1894) 21 Clunet, 138. In this
case the fact that consent could have been dispensed with by a formal
procedure was treated, not as reducing the consent to matter of form,
but as evidencing the absence of "clandestinity." Unlike Philip in
Ogden v. Ogden, supra, Gachon was thirty years of age.
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where a Greek married Caroline Henry in England without the
presence of an Orthodox priest; where the parties actually lived
together for some time; and where the Greek courts31 rendered
eventually a nullity decree, because the sacramental union had
not been created, which alone they considered a domiciled
Orthodox Greek competent to enter into. The marriage was
clearly good in England, and it was only by stretching a point
and assuming jurisdiction where there was no domicile that the
English court granted a dissolution decree.32
III
BARS UNKNOWN TO THE PERSONAL LAW
The question does not seem ever to have been much discussed
in England of whether the personal law can override the local
law, so as to make a marriage good, as well as to make it bad.
Can a person who is of age in her own country marry when
she is temporarily abroad in a country where the age of con-
sent is above her own? Will the English court recognize the
capacity of a foreign domiciled uncle and niece to. marry in
England, if such a union is permitted by their personal law?
Will it recognize as valid the marriage of domiciled English
'The English courts will probably not entertain an action of nullity
unless the defendant is domiciled, or at least resident, in England. In
Linke v. Van Aerde (1893) 1o Times L. R. 426, the fact of England
being the locus celebrationis was held sufficient But if the question of
marriage or no marriage arises indirectly, they will not hesitate to decide
it on proper evidence of the law of the foreign country, or countries, which
may be concerned. Spain equally abstains from deciding directly on the
marriage even of Spaniards in a foreign country and in foreign forms.
P. y B. Josi v. G. Isabelle (1912) 39 Clunet, 284. But Brazil is so accom-
modating as to give divorces on German grounds to German subjects in
Brazil'although its own law recognizes no such thing as divorce, Ulbrich
v. Ulbrich (913) 40 Clunet, 1329; and France, with even greater
complaisance, hands it over to French Jews to divorce Russian Jews in
France, Rosenbaum v. Kuhn (1912) 39 Clunet, 192.
'For the reasons above given, p. 452 f., I think it a mistake to do this.
There is no natural right to divorce, which must viis et modis be sub-
served. And it is somewhat grotesque to treat a man as living in
adultery because he is living with a person who by the law of his
domicile (which is what English law recognizes as determining his
status) and nationality is his lawful wife. To mix up the laws of two
or more countries in order to ascertain a person's marital position is a
risky adventure.
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cousins in Portugal, where the local law forbids such marriages?
It is possible that different answers will be given to these ques-
tions just as different answers were given to the inverse problems
raised in Mette v. Mete and Sottomayor v. De Barros, two con-
sistorial cases, on which Mr. Westlake relied to show that the
local law must be complied with, which are very inconclusive.-
The Hague Private Law Conventions,34 which Mr. A. K. Kuhn
has so well put before English readers in his edition of the late
Professor Meili's work, allow a country to refuse validity to
marriages celebrated on its soil which outrage its religious pro-
visions. But even these Conventions do not entitle a country to
refuse validity to marriages which violate the religious prohibi-
tions of other places of celebration. Thus, if we regard a mar-
riage between uncle and niece as prohibited in England on
religious grounds, which it undoubtedly was at the inception of
the prohibition, England would, nevertheless, be obliged to
recognize such marriages, valid .by the Norwegian personal law
of the parties, if they were celebrated in New York, even though
New York law might, on equally religious grounds, contain a
similar prohibition-a sufficiently absurd result. Moreover, it
is difficult to assign a positively religious basis to most prohibi-
tions: probably the special obligations of monks and nuns were
alone in view when the Convention was framed. Thus the word
"religious" would have a very narrow interpretation. It seems
altogether too ambiguous a term to be employed in so important
a context. The Belgian court has declined to regard the pro-
hibition to Catholics to marry divorced Catholics as based on
religious grounds.3
It is perhaps not unnatural that one, always ready for adop-
tion, should turn with a certain sense of relief to the alternative
of discarding the personal law in all these matters of capacity,
and of leaving the decision entirely to the local law, and this is
'Scrimshire v. Scrimshire (752) 2 Hagg. Cons. 395; Middleton V.
Janverin (1802) 2 Hagg. Cons. 437. In both cases the local forms had not
been complied with; nor can Simpson and Wynne who decided them be
looked upon as first rate authorities.
" Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom is a party to these
instruments, the effect of war on which is the subject of argument.
Pillet seems to hold, with justice, that such multiple conventions are in
principle destroyed by the outbreak of war between any of the parties;
though the rest may tacitly resume the pact.
'Ritter v. Miko (904) 3 Clunet, I42.
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the view put forward by the late Chief Justice of England in an
article written in 189786 There is no reason why a foreigner
should not make himself acquainted with that law's provisions
when taking so important and irrevocable a step. There is no
likelihood that anybody will be deceived as to what country he
is being married in. The evils of a conflict between the lex loci
celebrationis and the lex civitatis are apt to be much exaggerated.
They may be avoided by ordinary care; and it may be better to
have one's marriage valid in one's own country alone, than to
be obliged to find oneself unmarried anywhere. Possibly a
better solution might be to allow a marriage to be good which is
valid according to any law which may reasonably be invoked as
applicable-lex loci, lex domicilii, lex civitatis ligeantiae, perhaps
lex fori. But the world of 1917 A. D. is by no means ripe for
such a development.3 7 The worst solution of all, however, is that
of enforcing one's own law as a personal law abroad, while
refusing, or grudgingly according recognition to foreign laws at
home. Ogden v. Ogden marks a strong tendency to protect
English ladies of mature years from the consequences of their
own imprudence, and to do so at the expense of foreign minors.
It is almost to be regretted that the case did not go to the House
of Lords, which tribunal could scarcely have failed to remark
the difficulty of distinguishing between an incapacity to marry
without parental consent and any other substantial incapacity.
It is remarkable that the Italian law, which is almost as devoted
as Mr. Weiss to the supremacy of the law of the nationality
over the personal status, declines to hold a foreigner entitled to
marry in Italy if he is a minor by Italian law!
And it must always be remembered that no country will enforce
a union, whether contracted within or without its limits, and
whether between its domiciled inhabitants or anyone else, which
is repugnant to its criminal law or to its sense of morality. Thus,
we cannot expect that a union between niece and uncle would
be recognized in England in the case (which OlivecronaO8
assures us has occurred) where the persons were Norwegians
living in Norway at the time of their marriage, although the mar-
riage may have been perfectly valid there. Yet some effect might
(i897) 24 Clunet, 669. This rule is said to be adopted in the United
States, in Argentine, and in Brazil
' Cf. Jitta, Obligations, passim.
' Le mariage des itrangers en Suede (1883) io Clmet, 352; (i911)
38 Clunet, 4o2.
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be allowed to its operation on property situate in England on
the footing of its being a contractual arrangement with the
morality or criminality of which the English courts had nothing
to do.
In Sweden, the repugnance to such a marriage, though it
would be invalid in Sweden, would apparently not extend to
induce the Swedish courts to treat it as invalid under such
circumstances unless the husband acquired Swedish nationality,
though it still remains forcible enough to induce Sweden to take
advantage of the liberty accorded by the Hague Private Law
Convention, to refuse such relatives permission to marry in
Sweden.39
In Switzerland, it appears, such marriages are illegal, but if
contracted abroad, will be accorded recognition"
0 even when the
parties are Swiss and domiciled in Switzerland. Switzerland
appears only to marry such foreigners as are domiciled (perma-
nently settled) in Switzerland. 41 This is not a bad solution
of the whole difficulty for those countries whith adopt domicile
as the criterion of the personal status. Why should a transient
foreigner wish to marry? Why should not his intended consort
establish a domicile in the country where such a stranger is
settled? There are answers to these questions, but apparently
Switzerland regards them as insufficient.
In England a marriage between a widow and the brother of
her deceased husband, celebrated in Italy between domiciled
42
Italians, was naturally held valid.4
3 Naturally, because such
marriages caused no repugnance to public sentiment-the House
of Commons had repeatedly pronounced in favor of very similar
ones-so that there was nothing to prevent the Italian law from
applying, as the law of place and domicile combined. But in
Guernsey, the Dean annulled the marriage, there celebrated,
of a divorced person though domiciled and divorced in England."
We, therefore, need clearly to distinguish those cases in which
capacity is a mere matter of local regulation, and those in which
'Reuterski6ld, Le mariage, le divorce et la tutelle d'apr&s le droit
international priv6 suidois (1g91) 38 Clunet, 405.
'A. Martin, Du mariage et du divorce des itrangers en Suisse (1897)
24 Clunet, 74o, 747; but cf. 922.
'A. Martin (1897) 24 Clunet, 74o.
'It is worth noticing that the lady was of British nationality.
'In re Bozzelli [9o2] I Ch. 751.
"Smith v. Kentfield (I889) 16 Clunet, 13o; (Dec. 6, i888) LONDN TIMES.
35
YALE LAW JOURNAL
it rests on an energetic sentiment of repulsion. In the former
case, it is possible that the personal law will prevail over local
bars (at any rate, when it is also the lex fori). In the latter,
it cannot often prevail over the bars established by the lex fori,
and whether it prevails over the bars of the lex loci is a very
dubious question. Suppose the question to arise in an English
court of a marriage per verba de praesenti of black and white
persons in an American state where such marriages are pro-
hibited, both parties being domiciled in a state where they are
permitted. The lex fori, entertaining no sentiments of repug-
nance to such a union, has no reason for disregarding the capacity
conferred by the lex domicilii. Will it take account of the
repugnance of the lex locif It is probably not repugnant to its
own ideas to do so; to recognize such prohibitory legislation is
not like recognizing religious vows or slavery" or penal law.
But will it think it necessary to draw the line between prohibi-
tions that are specially dear to the lex loci, and prohibitions that
are not so deeply rooted in its sentiment? Will it allow marriage
with a deceased husband's brother to be valid, and treat mar-
riage with a negro as void, where both are prohibited in the
locus and permitted in the domicile? It is impossible for a
foreign court to draw any such line. If it recognizes the
capacity conferred by the personal law as overriding the law of
the locus, it must recognize it for all purposes, saving its own
overpowering predilections."8 The difficulty of attempting to
draw such a line, even for itself, is considerable. Thus, Bus-
dugan47 does not think that a Roumanian court would decline to
recognize the marriage of a twelve-year-old Austrian in Rou-
mania, whilst it would so decline to recognize the marriage df
cousins, or of a deceased wife's sister.
We have seen the Supreme Court of Austria varying, within
two short years, in its manner of regarding Jew-Christian mar-
riages: at one time finding no fault with them, so long as they
'It illustrates the difficulty of the whole subject that Busdugan, infra,
thinks that the Roumanian tribunals would have no repugnance to recog-
nizing religious bars whilst they would refuse to recognize bars based
on color or race distinctions. He is speaking of marriages solemnized
in Roumania between strangers.
"Saving also the operation of a renvoi by the personal law, for those
who accept the guidance of this will o' wisp doctrine.
' See an exhaustive and able article, Du mariage des Roumains a
l'tranger (igoo) 27 Clunet, 749, 757.
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are not solemnized in the sacred dominions; at another, regard-
ing them as impossible for an Austrian subject; at another,
declining to recognize them at all, as being fundamentally incon-
sistent with Austrian ideas. This shows how impossible it is for
unfortunate private persons or for the courts of other countries
to draw the delicate distinction. It may be added that the
Supreme Court at Vienna usually contradicted the courts below.
Parenthetically, these fluctuations of opinion show how impos-
sible is the contention of Mr. Weiss, that the Tables of Affinity
must invariably be matter d'orde public, which a nation can never
relax in favor of foreign regulations. Whilst England was
counting among its prohibited affinities that which exists with a
deceased wife's sister, it was actually passing a statute declaring
that marriages within that prohibited degree contracted (even
in England) by persons domiciled in the colonies where such
unions were lawful, were valid to all intents in England. The
violation of orde public then, implies a real horror or shock to
the national juridical consciousness, which is by no means found
in all the exceptions to the currency of foreign "personal" law
in a given country.
IV
MARRIAGE AND IKINDRED INSTITUTIONS
It must always be remembered that when we are discussing
the legal requisites of marriage, we mean marriage, and not the
miscellaneous unions which are loosely and in a literary sense
termed such. No polygamous union is regarded as marriage.
4
This provides the simple key to various cases which have been
the occasion of considerable perplexity in England. Thus .in
Chetti v. Chetti,49 there was a case of a Brimin; in Re Mir-
Anwaruddin, there was the case of a Mohammedan, affecting
to marry an English person in London. Each subsequently
attempted to avail himself of the incidents and provisions of the
law of his domicile (India). The fallacy was to assume that
these incidents had any relation to an occidental marriage. A
BrrAmin can only contract a Hindft "marriage" with the mem-
bers of certain specified castes. But neither Chetti nor his
inamorata had any idea when they visited the registrar of a
"In re Bethell (i888) 38 Ch. D. 22o.
' [i~ga] P. 67.
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London marriage district, that they were contracting any such
splendid and sacred union. They were celebrating-or at any
rate trying to celebrate-something very different. And if Mr.
Chetti should urge that his personal law imposed on him an
incapacity to enter into any such alien relationship as unsuited to
a Briamin, the answer is that, of penal and religious incapacities
imposed abroad, the law of England takes no notice. Also such
a prohibition could, in particular, be in restraint of marriage.
So with regard to Mr. Anwaruddin's tangle. He married in
England, but failing to induce his wife to live with him in India,
he applied to the courts of his Indian domicile for a divorce.
He not being a "Christian," they had no power under the statutes
to grant relief. The proper conclusion would seem to be that
he had no remedy-except possibly that of judicial separation
in the ecclesiastical court of the Indian bishop.-0 But, under the
conviction that he must be able to secure a dissolution viis et
modis, he purported to effect a divorce, modo islamitico, by a
triple bill under his hand. Now, this might have dissolved a
Mohammedan "marriage"; but he had not, by the ceremony
in England, contracted a Mohammedan marriage--but something
very different. He applied afterwards for the issue of a civil
marriage license in London, on the footing of the former union
being thus dissolved. The registrar refused to issue one, and
the court of King's Bench declined to order that officer to do so. 51
Dr. Anwaruddin had meanwhile obtained some encouragement
from Justice Deane, who had expressed an opinion that the mar-
riage was dissolved, in declining to entertain formal application by
Dr. Anwaruddin for restitution of conjugal rights which pro-
ceeded on the footing that it still existed. The King's Bench,
therefore, holds that Dr. Anwaruddin is married, and the
matrimonial judge that he is not. The Court of Appeal may solve
the conflict.
52
' The power to grant matrimonial relief is incident to the bishops by
common law. They have been deprived of it in England by statute. But
if no other matrimonial jurisdiction exists-as apparently in India, where
one party is not a Christian-it would seem to be unimpaired.
'A similar result was reached in French Tunis in i9o8. Mignet v.
Abdelaziz Sfar (9o9) 36 Clunet, io75. Cf. however, Achouche v. Touaty
(i9io) 37 Clunet, 56I, 564, where a Jew of Algiers who married a lady
called Valensi before the French registrar, in i863, was held entitled to
contract a subsequent Jewish marriage.
"[In Ex parte Mir-Anwaruddin (i916) ii5 L. T. (Ct of App.) 882
(issue of Feb. 17, 1917) it was held that his marriage was, according to
English law, still subsisting.-ED.]
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There remained possible alternatives for Mr. Anwaruddin,
short of the heroic remedy of cutting the Gordian knot by a
change of domicile or a bill in Parliament. English courts will
only dissolve marriages where the husband's domicile is English.
But there is beginning to be recognized an exception to that rule
in cases where, for one reason or another, there is no possibility
of procuring a dissolution in the foreign jurisdiction. It is not
probable that jurisdiction would be assumed merely because
divorce a vinculo was unknown to the foreign law (as in Italy).
If an English person chooses to marry an Italian, she must
accept the consequences-including the indissolubility of the tie.
But sometimes, where divorce is freely recognized, there is a
hitch in the machinery. The most glaring case appeared from
Ogden v. Ogden, where the English wife could not get a divorce
in the French husband's domicile, because the French courts did
not consider her married. It was suggested that in these cir-
cumstances the English court, though not the court of the
domicile, might assume jurisdiction. And so it did in the subse-
quent case of Stathatos v. Stathatos,53 in which the domicile of
the husband was Greek. As has been observed, the consequence
is to introduce a new and serious confusion into marriage law.
For the English court, thus assuming jurisdiction, can hardly
apply5" any other than its own matrimonial law to the conduct of
the parties and to the incidents of the divorce, which nevertheless
if the foreign court had assumed the jurisdiction would clearly
have been governed by the foreign law. There is a tendency to
extend this assumption of jurisdiction to the case of a deserted
wife. The American principle, according to which a wife may
have an independent domicile, would thus be approximated to.
But, so far this recognition of the right of the English court to
entertain such a suit has been limited to the minor case of jurisdic-
tion in suits for divorce a mensa et thoro,55 as to which it was long
uncertain whether the true ground of assuming jurisdiction was
domicile or mere residence.5" Still the doctrine might have been
extended to relieve a Mohammedan Indian, who had contracted
[1913] P. 46.
"And in fact, being the creature of precise statutory provisions, has
probably no power to apply.
SArmytage v. Armytage [1898] P. 178.
mNigoyet v. Nigoyet (1878) 4 P. D. i; Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier
[1895] A. C. 5,7o
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a marriage, to deal with which there existed in his own domicile
no machinery at all. It would be a dangerous principle, because
non constat that the intention of the Indian legislature was not
to deprive parties to such a mixed marriage of marital relief.
But, being so seductive a principle, there is little doubt but that
it would have prevailed, though the consequence is almost to
consecrate Chev. Fortunato's doctrine that there is a "natural
right" to divorce.57
Is it bigamy for an Oriental who has contracted an occidental
marriage to contract a fresh one? Obviously so, if we are right:
his liberty to have four "wives" has nothing to do with wives
in the occidental sense. His oriental marriages, on the other
hand,5" even if contracted in England or America, will not be
bigamous because he already has "wives." They are an entirely
different style of thing. Thus, it is said that an ex-inmate of
Ismail Pasha's harem was duly admitted to marry an Italian at
Naples.5" How far these positions are supported by American
cases, particularly from Utah, the writer is not aware. Again,
is intercourse with such "wives" adultery? Here we are on
extremely difficult ground. But on principle, it seems to be so.
It is true that the connection is not obnoxious to the penal law:
the connection is a licit and a respectable one. But the founda-
tion of the matrimonial law regulating the occidental marriage
is religious and ecclesiastical. Although its connection with
religion may have disappeared, so far as ceremonies and courts
are concerned, it remains true that the principles governing it
are the old ecclesiastical principles. For the sake of certainty
they must be upheld unless and until they are expressly altered
by the legislature. And the very core of the marriage relation,
according to those principles, is its. unity. Intercourse, however
legitimate, with a second consort, is necessarily a ground of
divorce a mensa. And since the legislature has made it a ground
of divorce a vinculo, it seems a necessary consequence that its
See Madrid Conference Report, International Law Association (1913)
p. 446.
' Cf. Achouche v. Toualy (9IO) 37 Clunet, 561, where a Jew of Algiers
in 1863 married one Valensi before the French civil officer and was held
probably entitled to marry in the Jewish form in her lifetime. In France,
and on the continent of Europe generally, the distinction between
monogamous marriage and the various forms of polygamy has never
been distinctly perceived.
"(889) 16 Clunet, 7o8.
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legitimacy and respectability will not hinder it from having this
effect. It is not what the consort was entitled to expect.
On the other hand, the subsistence of an oriental marriage
would seem to be no bar to the conclusion of an occidental one.
It would, however, afford a strong ground for declining to accord
the occidental consort a divorce founded on the continuance
of relations with the oriental parties (unless such consort had
been kept in ignorance of their existence), under the English
system, which makes connivance or conduct conducing to the
illicit intercourse, a ground for refusing relief.
In some countries, the ambiguity is solved by prohibiting mar-
riage between Christians and non-Christians. The prohibition
usually extends to Catholic and orthodox Christians only, and
not to Protestants. On the other hand, it extends to Jews as well
as Mohammedans and Hindfis. Such prohibitions would clearly
receive no recognition in England, whatever the nationality or
domicile of the parties, or (perhaps) the place of celebration.
It is a cardinal principle that religious disabilities will not be
noticed. As to ihe contention which is sometimes raised, that the
Jewish religious law should always and everywhere be applied




Gottlieb v. Gottlieb (Igo8) 35 Clunet, 813. In this curious case, the
Seine Civil Court declined to allow a lady to impeach her marriage on the
ground of a supposed incapacity on the part of the other consort (a
Russian) to contract a civil marriage. But why not? The court styled
the incapacity a "benefit" conferred on the Russian by his personal law-
but surely it was not solely as a benefit to him that Russia established it I
